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Abstract
We introduce GOTCHAs (Generating panOptic Turing Tests to Tell
Computers and Humans Apart) as a way of preventing automated offline
dictionary attacks against user selected passwords. A GOTCHA is a ran-
domized puzzle generation protocol, which involves interaction between a
computer and a human. Informally, a GOTCHA should satisfy two key
properties: (1) The puzzles are easy for the human to solve. (2) The puz-
zles are hard for a computer to solve even if it has the random bits used
by the computer to generate the final puzzle — unlike a CAPTCHA [43].
Our main theorem demonstrates that GOTCHAs can be used to mitigate
the threat of offline dictionary attacks against passwords by ensuring that
a password cracker must receive constant feedback from a human being
while mounting an attack. Finally, we provide a candidate construction
of GOTCHAs based on Inkblot images. Our construction relies on the
usability assumption that users can recognize the phrases that they orig-
inally used to describe each Inkblot image — a much weaker usability
assumption than previous password systems based on Inkblots which re-
quired users to recall their phrase exactly. We conduct a user study to
evaluate the usability of our GOTCHA construction. We also generate
a GOTCHA challenge where we encourage artificial intelligence and se-
curity researchers to try to crack several passwords protected with our
scheme.
1 Introduction
Any adversary who has obtained the cryptographic hash of a user’s password
can mount an automated brute-force attack to crack the password by com-
∗This work was partially supported by the NSF Science and Technology TRUST and the
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an NSF Graduate Fellowship.
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paring the cryptographic hash of the user’s password with the cryptographic
hashes of likely password guesses. This attack is called an offline dictionary
attack, and there are many password crackers that an adversary could use [17].
Offline dictionary attacks against passwords are — unfortunately — powerful
and commonplace [25]. Adversaries have been able to compromise servers at
large companies (e.g., Zappos, LinkedIn, Sony, Gawker [5, 2, 9, 4, 1, 3]) result-
ing in the release of millions of cryptographic password hashes 1. It has been
repeatedly demonstrated that users tend to select easily guessable passwords
[27, 18, 11], and password crackers are able to quickly break many of these
passwords[39]. Offline attacks are becoming increasingly dangerous as comput-
ing hardware improves — a modern GPU can evaluate a cryptographic hash
function like SHA2 about 250 million times per second [49] — and as more
and more training data — leaked passwords from prior breaches — becomes
available [25]. Symantec reported that compromised passwords have significant
economic value to an adversary (e.g., compromised passwords are sold on black
market for between $4 and $30 ) [22].
HOSPs (Human-Only Solvable Puzzles) were suggested by Canetti, Halevi
and Steiner as a way of defending against offline dictionary attacks [14]. The
basic idea is to change the authentication protocol so that human interaction
is required to verify a password guess. The authentication protocol begins with
the user entering his password. In response the server randomly generates a
challenge — using the password as a source of randomness — for the user to
solve. Finally, the server appends the user’s response to the user’s password,
and verifies that the hash matches the record on the server. To crack the user’s
password offline the adversary must simultaneously guess the user’s password
and the answer to the corresponding puzzle. The challenge should be easy for
a human to solve consistently so that a legitimate user can authenticate. To
mitigate the threat of an offline dictionary attack the HOSP should be difficult
for a computer to solve — even if it has all of the random bits used to generate
the challenge.
The basic HOSP construction proposed by Canetti et al. [14] was to to fill a
hard drive with regular CAPTCHAs (e.g., distorted text) by storing the puzzles
without the answers. This solution only provides limited protection against
an adversary because the number of unique puzzles that can be generated is
bounded by the size of the hard drive (e.g., the adversary could pay people to
solve all of the puzzles on the hard drive). See appendix B for more discussion.
Finding a usable HOSP construction which does not rely on a very large dataset
of pregenerated CAPTCHAs is an open problem. Several candidate HOSPs were
experimentally tested [15] (they are called POSHs in the second paper), but the
usability results were underwhelming.
Contributions We introduce a simple modification of HOSPs that we call
GOTCHAs (Generating panOptic Turing Tests to Tell Computers and Humans
Apart). We use the adjective Panoptic to refer to a world without privacy —
1In a few of these cases [3, 1] the passwords were stored in the clear.
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there are no hidden random inputs to the puzzle generation protocol. The basic
goal of GOTCHAs is similar to the goal of HOSPs — defending against offline
dictionary attacks. GOTCHAs differ from HOSPs in two ways (1) Unlike a
HOSP a GOTCHA may require human interaction during the generation of the
challenge. (2) We relax the requirement that a user needs to be able to answer
all challenges easily and consistently. If the user can remember his password
during the authentication protocol then he will only ever see one challenge. We
only require that the user must be able to answer this challenge consistently.
If the user enters the wrong password during authentication then he may see
new challenges. We do not require that the user must be able to solve these
challenges consistently because authentication will fail in either case. We do
require that it is difficult for a computer to distinguish between the “correct”
challenge and an “incorrect” challenge. Our main theorem demonstrates that
GOTCHAs like HOSPs can be used to defend against offline dictionary attacks.
The goal of these relaxations is to enable the design of usable GOTCHAs.
We introduce a candidate GOTCHA construction based on Inkblot images.
While the images are generated randomly by a computer, the human mind can
easily imagine semantically meaningful objects in each image. To generate a
challenge the computer first generates ten inkblot images (e.g., figure 1). The
user then provides labels for each image (e.g., evil clown, big frog). During au-
thentication the challenge is to match each inkblot image with the corresponding
label. We empirically evaluate the usability of our inkblot matching GOTCHA
construction by conducting a user study on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Finally,
we challenge the AI community to break our GOTCHA construction.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We next discuss
related work in section 1.1. We formally define GOTCHAs in section 2 and for-
malize the properties that a GOTCHA should satisfy. We present our candidate
GOTCHA construction in section 3, and in section 3.1 we demonstrate how our
GOTCHA could be integrated into an authentication protocol. We present the
results from our user study in section 3.2, and in section 3.3 we challenge the
AI and security communities to break our GOTCHA construction. In section
4 we prove that GOTCHAs like HOSPs can also be used to design a password
storage system which mitigates the threat of offline attacks. We conclude by
discussing future directions and challenges in section 5.
1.1 Related Work
Inkblots [42] have been proposed as an alternative way to generate and remem-
ber passwords. Stubblefield and Simon proposed showing the user ten randomly
generated inkblot images, and having the user make up a word or a phrase to
describe each image. These phrases were then used to build a 20 character pass-
word (e.g., users were instructed to take the first and last letter of each phrase).
Usability results were moderately good, but users sometimes had trouble re-
membering their association. Because the Inkblots are publicly available there
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Figure 1: Randomly Generated Inkblot Image—An evil clown?
is also a security concern that Inkblot passwords could be guessable if different
users consistently picked similar phrases to describe the same Inkblot.
We stress that our use of Inkblot images is different in two ways: (1) Usabil-
ity: We do not require users to recall the word or phrase associated with each
Inkblot. Instead we require user’s to recognize the word or phrase associated
with each Inkblot so that they can match each phrase with the appropriate
Inkblot image. Recognition is widely accepted to be easier than the task of
recall [7, 45]. (2) Security: We do not need to assume that it would be difficult
for other humans to match the phrases with each Inkblot. We only assume that
it is difficult for a computer to perform this matching automatically.
CAPTCHAs — formally introduced by Von Ahn et al. [43] — have gained
widespread adoption on the internet to prevent bots from automatically reg-
istering for accounts. A CAPTCHA is a program that generates a puzzle —
which should be easy for a human to solve and difficult for a computer to solve
— as well as a solution. Many popular forms of CAPTCHAs (e.g., reCAPTCHA
[44]) generate garbled text, which is easy 2 for a human to read, but difficult
for a computer to decipher. Other versions of CAPTCHAs rely on the natural
human capacity for audio [37] or image recognition [19].
CAPTCHAs have been used to defend against online password guessing
attacks — users are sometimes required to solve a CAPTCHA before signing
2Admitedly some people would dispute the use of the label ‘easy.’
4
into their account. An alternative approach is to lock out a user after several
incorrect guesses, but this can lead to denial of service attacks [16]. However,
if the adversary has access to the cryptographic hash of the user’s password,
then he can circumvent all of these requirements and execute an automatic
dictionary attack to crack the password offline. By contrast HOSPs — proposed
by Canetti et al.[14] — were proposed to defend against offline attacks. HOSPs
are in some ways similar to CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Turing Tests
to Tell Computers and Humans Apart) [43]. CAPTCHAs are widely used on
the internet to fight spam by preventing bots from automatically registering for
accounts. In this setting a CAPTCHA is sent to the user as a challenge, while
the secret solution is used to grade the user’s answer. The implicit assumption is
that the answer and the random bits used to generate the puzzle remain hidden
— otherwise a spam bot could simply regenerate the puzzle and the answer.
While this assumption may be reasonable in the spam bot setting, it does not
hold in our offline password attack setting in which the server has already been
breached. A HOSP is different from a CAPTCHA in several key ways: (1)
The challenge must remain difficult for a computer to solve even if the random
bits used to generate the puzzle are made public. (2) There is no single correct
answer to a HOSP. It is okay if different people give different responses to a
challenge as long as people can respond to the challenges easily, and each user
can consistently answer the challenges.
The only HOSP construction proposed in [14] involved stuffing a hard drive
with unsolved CAPTCHAs. The problem of finding a HOSP construction that
does not rely on a dataset of unsolved CAPTCHAs was left as an open problem
[14]. Several other candidate HOSP constructions have been experimentally
evaluated in subsequent work [15] (they are called POSHs in the second paper),
but the usability results for every scheme that did not rely on a large dataset
on unsolved CAPTCHAs were underwhelming.
GOTCHAs are very similar to HOSPs. The basic application — defending
against offline dictionary attacks — is the same as are the key tools: exploit-
ing the power of interaction during authentication, exploiting hard artificial
intelligence problems. While the authentication with HOSPs is interactive, the
initial generation of the puzzle is not. By contrast, our GOTCHA construction
requires human interaction during the initial generation of the puzzle. This
simple relaxation allows for the construction of new solutions. In the HOSP pa-
per humans are simply modeled as a puzzle solving oracle, and the adversary is
assumed to have a limited number of queries to a human oracle. We introduce a
more intricate model of the human agent with the goal of designing more usable
constructions.
Password Storage Password storage is an incredibly challenging problem.
Adversaries have been able to compromise servers at many large companies (e.g.,
Zappos, LinkedIn, Sony, Gawker [5, 2, 9, 4, 1, 3]). For example, hackers were
able to obtain 32 million plaintext passwords from RockYou using a simple SQL
injection attack [1]. While it is considered an extremely poor security practice
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to store passwords in the clear [41], the practice is still fairly common [12, 3, 1].
Many other companies [4, 12] have used cryptographic hashes to store their
passwords, but failed to adopt the practice of salting (e.g., instead of storing
the cryptographic hash of the password h(pw) the server stores (h (pw, r) , r)
for a random string r [6]) to defend against rainbow table attacks. Rainbow
tables, which consist of precomputed hashes, are often used by an adversary to
significantly speed up a password cracking attack because the same table can
be reused to attack each user when the passwords are unsalted [33].
Cryptographic hash functions like SHA1, SHA2 and MD5 — designed for
fast hardware computation — are popular choices for password hashing. Unfor-
tunately, this allows an adversary to try up to 250 million guesses per second on
a modern GPU [49]. The BCRYPT [35] hash function was designed specifically
with passwords in mind — BCRYPT was intentionally designed to be slow to
compute (e.g., to limit the power of an adversary’s offline attack). The BCRYPT
hash function takes a parameter which allows the programmer to specify how
costly the hash computation should be. The downside to this approach is that
it also increases costs for the company that stores the passwords (e.g., if we
want it to cost the adversary $1,000 for every million guesses then it will also
cost the company at least $1,000 for every million login attempts).
Users are often advised (or required) to follow strict guidelines when selecting
their password (e.g., use a mix of upper/lower case letters, include numbers and
change the password frequently) [38]. However, empirical studies show that
user’s are are often frustrated by restricting policies and commonly forget their
passwords [28, 29, 20] 3. Furthermore, the cost of these restrictive policies can
be quite high. For example, a Gartner case study [47] estimated that it cost
over $17 per password-reset call. Florencio and Herley [21] studied the economic
factors that institutions consider before adopting password policies and found
that they often value usability over security.
2 Definitions
In this section we seek to establish a theoretical basis for GOTCHAs. Several
of the ideas behind our definitions are borrowed from theoretical definitions of
CAPTCHAs [43] and HOSPs [14]. Like CAPTCHAs and HOSPs, GOTCHAs
are based on the assumption that some AI problem is hard for a computer
to solve, but easy for a person to solve. Ultimately, these assumptions are
almost certainly false (e.g., because the human brain can solve a GOTCHA
it is reasonable to believe that there exists a computer program to solve the
problems). However, it may still be reasonable to assume that these problems
cannot be solved by applying known ideas. By providing a formal definition of
GOTCHAs we can determine whether or not a new idea can be used to break
a candidate GOTCHA construction.
We use c ∈ C to denote the space of challenges that might be generated. We
use H to denote the set of human users and H (c, σt) to denote the response
3In fact the resulting passwords are sometimes more vulnerable to an offline attack! [28, 29]
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that a human H ∈ H gives to the challenge c ∈ C at time t. Here, σt denotes
the state of the human’s brain at time t. σt is supposed to encode our user’s
existing knowledge (e.g., vocabulary, experiences) as well as the user’s mental
state at time t (e.g., what is the user thinking about at time t). Because σt
changes over time (e.g., new experiences) we use H (c) = {H (c, σt) t ∈ N} to
denote the set of all answers a human might give to a challenge c. We use A
to denote the range of possible responses (answers) that a human might give to
the challenges.
Definition 1 Given a metric d : A × A → R, we say that a human H can
consistently solve a challenge c ∈ C with accuracy α if ∀t ∈ N
d (H (c, σ0) , H (c, σt)) ≤ α ,
where σ0 denotes the state of the human’s brain when he initially answers the
challenge. If |H (c)| = 1 then we simply say that the human can consistently
solve the challenge.
Notation: When we have a group of challenges 〈c1, . . . , ck〉 we will sometimes
write H (〈c1, . . . , ck〉, σt) =
〈H (c1, σt) , . . . , H (ck, σt)〉 for notational convenience. We use y ∼ D to denote
a random sample from the distribution D, and we use r
$
← {0, 1}n to denote a
element drawn from the set {0, 1}n uniformly at random.
One of the requirements of a HOSP puzzle system [14] is that the human H
must be able to consistently answer any challenge that is generated (e.g., ∀c ∈ C,
H can consistently solve c). These requirements seem to rule out promising ideas
for HOSP constructions like Inkblots[15]. In this construction the challenge
is a randomly generated inkblot image I, and the response H (I, σ0) is word
or phrase describing what the user initially sees in the inkblot image (e.g.,
evil clown, soldier, big lady with a ponytail). User studies have shown that
H (I, σ0) does not always match H (I, σt) — the phrase describing what the
user sees at time t [15]. In a few cases the errors may be correctable (e.g.,
capitalization, plural/singular form of a word), but oftentimes the phrase was
completely different — especially if a long time passed in between trials 4. By
contrast, our GOTCHA construction does not require the user to remember
the phrases associated with each Inkblot. Instead we rely on a much weaker
assumption — the user can consistently recognize his solutions. We say that a
human can recognize his solutions to a set of challenges if he can consistently
solve a matching challenge (definition 2) in which he is asked to match each of
his solutions with the corresponding challenge.
Definition 2 Given an integer k, and a permutation π : [k]→ [k], a matching
challenge cˆpi = (~c,~a) ∈ C of size k is given by a k-tuple of challenges ~c =
4We would add the requirement that the human must be able to consistently answer the
challenges without spending time memorizing and rehearsing his response to the challenge.
Otherwise we could just as easily force the user to remember a random string to append on
to his password.
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〈cpi(1), . . . , cpi(k)〉 ∈ C
k and solutions ~a = H (〈c1, . . . , ck〉, σ0). The response to a
matching challenge is a permutation π′ = H (~cpi, σt).
For permutations π : [k]→ [k] we use the distance metric
dk (π1, π2) = |{i π1(i) 6= π2(i) ∧ 1 ≤ i ≤ k}| .
dk (π1, π2) simply counts the number of entries where the permutations don’t
match. We say that a human can consistently recognize his solution to a
matching challenge cˆpi with accuracy α if ∀t.dk (H (cˆpi, σt) , π) ≤ α. We use
{π′ dk (π, π
′) ≤ α} to denote the set of permutations π′ that are α-close to π.
The puzzle generation process for a GOTCHA involves interaction between
the human and a computer: (1) The computer generates a set of k challenges.
(2) The human solves these challenges. (3) The computer uses the solutions to
produce a final challenge 5. Formally,
Definition 3 A puzzle-system is a pair (G1, G2), where G1 is a randomized
challenge generator that takes as input 1k (with k security parameter) and a pair
of random bit strings r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1}
∗ and outputs k challenges 〈c1, . . . , ck〉 ←
G1
(
1k, r1, r2
)
. G2 is a randomized challenge generator that takes as input 1
k
(security parameter), a random bit string r1 ∈ {0, 1}
∗, and proposed answers
~a = 〈a1, ..., ak〉 to the challenges G1
(
1k, r1, r2
)
and outputs a challenge
cˆ← G2
(
1k, r1,~a
)
. We say that the puzzle-system is (α, β)-usable if
Pr
H
$
←H
[Accurate (H, cˆ, α)] ≥ β ,
whenever ~a = H
(
G1
(
1k, r1, r2
)
, σ0
)
, where Accurate (H, cˆ, α) denotes the
event that the human H can consistently solve cˆ with accuracy α.
In our authentication setting the random string r1 is extracted from the
user’s password using a strong pseudorandom function Extract. To provide
a concrete example of a puzzle-system, G1 could be a program that generates
a set of inkblot challenges 〈I1, . . . , Ik〉 using random bits r1, selects a random
permutation π : [k] → [k] using random bits r2, and returns 〈Ipi(1), . . . , Ipi(k)〉.
The human’s response to an Inkblot —H (Ij , σ0) — is whatever he/she imagines
when he sees the inkblot Ij for the first time (e.g., some people might imagine an
evil clown when they look at figure 1). Finally, G2 might generate Inkblots ~c =
〈I1, . . . , Ik〉 using random bits r1, and return the matching challenge cˆpi = (~c,~a).
In this case the matching challenge is for the user to match his labels with the
appropriate Inkblot images to recover the permutation π. Observe that the final
challenge — cˆpi — can only be generated after a round of interaction between
the computer and a human. By contrast, the challenges in a HOSP must be
generated automatically by a computer. Also notice that if G2 is executed with
5We note that a HOSP puzzle system (G) [14] can be modeled as a GOTCHA puzzle
system (G1, G2) where G1 does nothing and G2 simply runs G to generate the final challenge
cˆ directly.
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a different random bit string r′1 then we do not require the resulting challenge to
be consistently recognizable (e.g., if the user enters in the wrong password then
authentication will fail regardless of how he solves the resulting challenge). For
example, if the user enters the wrong password the user might be asked to match
his labels 〈ℓpi(1), ..., ℓpi(k)〉 = H
(
〈Ipi(1), . . . , Ipi(k)〉, σ0
)
with Inkblots 〈I ′1, . . . , I
′
k〉
that he has never seen.
An adversary could attack a puzzle system by either (1) attempting to dis-
tinguish between the correct puzzle, and puzzles that might be meaningless to
the human, or (2) by solving the matching challenge directly.
We say that an algorithm A can distinguish distributions D1 and D2 with
advantage ǫ if ∣∣∣∣ Prx∼D1 [A (x) = 1]− Pry∼D2 [A (y) = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ .
Our formal definition of a GOTCHA is found in definition 4. Intuitively,
definition 4 says that (1) The underlying puzzle-system should be usable —
so that legitimate users can authenticate. (2) It should be difficult for the
adversary to distinguish between the correct matching challenge (e.g., the one
that the user will see when he types in the correct password), and an incorrect
matching challenge (e.g., if the user enters the wrong password he will be asked
to match his labels with different Inkblot images), and (3) It should be difficult
for the adversary to distinguish between the user’s matching, and a random
matching drawn from a distribution R with sufficiently high minimum entropy.
Definition 4 A puzzle-system (G1, G2) is an (α, β, ǫ, δ, µ)-GOTCHA if (1) (G1, G2)
is (α, β)-usable (2) Given a human H ∈ H no probabilistic polynomial time al-
gorithm can distinguish between distributions
D1 =
{
H(G1(1k,r1,r2),σ0),
G2(1k,r1,H(G1(1k,r1,r2),σ0))
r1, r2
$
← {0, 1}n
}
and
D2 =
{
H(G1(1k,r1,r2),σ0),
G2(1k,r3,H(G1(1k,r1,r2),σ0))
r1, r2, r3
$
← {0, 1}n
}
with advantage greater than ǫ, and (3) Given a human H ∈ H, there is a
distribution R(c) with µ(m) bits of minimum entropy such that no probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm can distinguish between distributions
D3 =
{
H(G1(1k,r1,r2),σ0)
G2(1k,r1,H(G1(1k,r1,r2),σ0)),
H(G2(1k,r1,H(G1(1k,r1,r2),σ0)),σ0)
r1, r2
$
← {0, 1}n
}
and
D4 =
{
H(G1(1k,r1,r2),σ0)
G2(1k,r1,H(G1(1k,r1,r2),σ0)),
R(G2(1
m,r1,〈a1,...,am〉),σ0)
r1, r2
$
← {0, 1}n
}
with advantage greater then δ.
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2.1 Password Storage and Offline Attacks
To protect users in the event of a server breach organizations are advised to store
salted password hashes — using a cryptographic hash function (h : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}n) and a random bit string (s ∈ {0, 1}∗) [38]. For example, if a user (u)
chose the password (pw) the server would store the tuple (u, s, h (s, pw)). Any
adversary who has obtained (u, s, h (s, pw)) (e.g., through a server breach) may
mount a — fully automated — offline dictionary attack using powerful password
crackers like John the Ripper [17]. To verify a guess pw′ the adversary simply
computes h (s, pw′) and checks to see if this hash matches h (s, pw).
We assume that an adversary Adv who breaches the server can obtain the
code for h, as well as the code for any GOTCHAs used in the authentication
protocol. Given the code for h and the salt value s the adversary can construct
a function
VerifyHash (pw′) =
{
1 if h (s, pw) = h (s, pw′)
0 otherwise.
.
We also allow the adversary to have black box access to a GOTCHA solver
(e.g., a human). We use cH to denote the cost of querying a human and ch to
denote the cost of querying the function VerifyHash6, and we use nH (resp.
nh) to denote the number of queries to the human (resp. VerifyHash). Queries
to the human GOTCHA solver are much more expensive than queries to the
cryptographic hash function (cH ≫ ch) [31]. For technical reasons we limit our
analysis to conservative adversaries.
Definition 5 We say that an adversary Adv is conservative if (1) Adv uses
the cryptographic hash function h in a black box manner (e.g., the hash function
h and the stored hash value are only used to construct a subroutine VerifyHash
which is then used as a black box by Adv ), (2) The pseudorandom function
Extract is used as a black box, and (3) The adversary only queries a human
about challenges generated using a password guess.
It is reasonable to believe that our adversary is conservative. All existing pass-
word crackers (e.g., [17]) use the hash function as a black box, and it is difficult
to imagine that the adversary would benefit by querying a human solver about
Inkblots that are unrelated to the password.
We useD ⊆ {0, 1}∗ to denote a dictionary of likely guesses that the adversary
would like to try,
Cost (Adv, D) = (nhch + nHcH)
to denote the cost of the queries that the adversary makes to check each guess
in D, and Succeed (Adv, D, pw) to denote the event that the adversary makes
a query to VerifyHash that returns 1 (e.g., the adversary successfully finds
the user’s password pw). The adversary might use a computer program to try
6The value of ch may vary widely depending on the particular cryptographic hash function
— it is inexpensive to evaluate SHA1, but BCRYPT [35] may be very expensive to evaluate.
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to solve some of the GOTCHAs — to save cost by not querying a human.
However, in this case the adversary might fail to crack the password because
the GOTCHA solver found the wrong solution to one of the challenges.
Definition 6 An adversary Adv is (C, γ,D)-successful if Cost (Adv, D) ≤ C,
and
Pr
pw
$
←D
[Succeed (Adv, D, pw)] ≥ γ .
Our attack model is slightly different from the attack model in [14]. They
assume that the adversary may ask a limited number of queries to a human
challenge solution oracle. Instead we adopt an economic model similar to [10],
and assume that the adversary is instead limited by a budget C, which may be
used to either evaluate the cryptographic hash function h or query a human H .
3 Inkblot Construction
Our candidate GOTCHA construction is based on Inkblots images. We use al-
gorithm 1 to generate inkblot images. Algorithm 1 takes as input random bits r1
and a security parameter k — which specifies the number of Inkblots to output.
Algorithm 1 makes use of the randomized subroutineDrawRandomEllipsePairs (I, t, width, height)
which draws t pairs of ellipses on the image I with the specified width and height.
The first ellipse in each pair is drawn at a random (x, y) coordinate on the left
half of the image with a randomly selected color and angle α of rotation, and
the second ellipse is mirrored on the right half of the image. Figure 1 is an
example of an Inkblot image generated by algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 GenerateInkblotImages
Input: Security Parameter 1k, Random bit string r1 ∈ {0, 1}
∗.
for j = 1, . . . , k do
Ij ← new Blank Image ⊲ The following operations only use the random
bit string r1 as a source of randomness
DrawRandomEllipsePairs (Ij , 150, 60, 60)
DrawRandomEllipsePairs (Ij , 70, 20, 20)
DrawRandomEllipsePairs (Ij , 150, 60, 20)
return 〈I1, . . . , Ik〉 ⊲ Inkblot Images
Our candidate GOTCHA is given by the pair (G1, G2) — algorithms 2 and
3. G1 runs algorithm 1 to generate k Inkblot images, and then returns these
images in permuted order — using a function
GenerateRandomPermutation (k, r), which generates a random permuta-
tion π : [k] → [k] using random bits r. G2 also runs algorithm 1 to generate k
Inkblot images, and then outputs a matching challenge.
After the Inkblots 〈Ipi(1), . . . , Ipi(k)〉 have been generated, the human user is
queried to provide labels ℓpi(1), . . . , ℓpi(k) where
〈ℓpi(1), . . . , ℓpi(k)〉 = H
(
〈Ipi(1), . . . , Ipi(k)〉, σ0
)
.
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Algorithm 2 G1
Input: Security Parameter 1k, Random bit strings r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1}
∗.
〈I1, . . . , Ik〉 ← GenerateInkblotImages (k, r1)
π ← GenerateRandomPermutation (k, r2)
return 〈Ipi(1), . . . , Ipi(k)〉
In our authentication setting the server would store the labels ℓpi(1), . . . , ℓpi(k) in
permuted order. The final challenge — generated by algorithm 3 — is to match
the Inkblot images I1, . . . , Ik with the user generated labels ℓ1, ..., ℓk to recover
the permutation π.
Algorithm 3 GenerateMatchingChallenge G2
Input: Security Parameter 1k, Random bits r1 ∈ {0, 1}
∗ and labels ~a =
〈ℓpi(1), . . . , ℓpi(k)〉.
〈I1, . . . , Ik〉 ← GenerateInkblotImages
(
1k, r1
)
return cˆpi = (~c,~a) ⊲ Matching Challenge
Observation: Notice that if the random bits provided as input toGenerateInkblotImages
and
GenerateMatchingChallenge match that the user will see the same Inkblot
images in the final matching challenge. However, if the random bits do not
match (e.g., because the user typed the wrong password in our authentication
protocol) then the user will see different Inkblot images. The labels ℓ1, . . . , ℓk
will be the same in both cases.
3.1 GOTCHA Authentication
To illustrate how our GOTCHAs can be used to defend against offline attacks
we present the following authentication protocols: Create Account (pro-
tocol 3.1) and Authenticate (protocol 3.2). Communication in both proto-
cols should take place over a secure channel. Both protocols involve several
rounds of interaction between the user and the server. To create a new ac-
count the user sends his username/password to the server, the server responds
by generating k Inkblot images I1, . . . , Ik, and the user provides a response
〈ℓ1, . . . , ℓk〉 = H (〈I1, . . . , Ik〉, σ0) based on his mental state at the time — the
server stores these labels in permuted order ℓpi(1), . . . , ℓpi(k)
7. To authenticate
later the user will have to match these labels with the corresponding inkblot
images to recover the permutation π.
In section 4 we argue that the adversary who wishes to mount a cost effective
offline attack needs to obtain constant feedback from a human. Following [14]
7For a general GOTCHA, protocol 3.1 would need to have an extra round of communica-
tion. The server would send the user the final challenge generated by G2 and the user would
respond with H (G2 (, ) , σ0). Protocol 3.1 takes advantage of the fact that pi = H (G2 (, ) , σ0)
is already known.
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we assume that the function Extract : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n is a strong randomness
extractor, which can be used to extract random strings from the user’s password.
Recall that h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ denotes a cryptographic hash function.
Protocol 3.1: Create Account
Security Parameters: k, n.
(User): Select username (u) and password (pw) and send (u, pw) to the
server.
(Server): Sends Inkblots 〈I1, . . . , Ik〉 to the user where:
r′
$
← {0, 1}n, r1 ← Extract (pw, r
′), r2
$
← {0, 1}n and
〈I1, . . . , Ik〉 ← GenerateInkblotImages
(
1k, r1
)
(User): Sends responses 〈ℓ1, ..., ℓk〉 back to the server where:
〈ℓ1, . . . , ℓk〉 ← H (〈I1, . . . , Ik〉, σ0).
(Server): Store the tuple t where t is computed as follows:
Salt: s
$
← {0, 1}n
π ← GenerateRandomPermutation (k, r2).
hpw ← h (u, s, pw, π(1), ..., π(k))
t←
(
u, r′, s, hpw, ℓpi(1), . . . , ℓpi(k)
)
Protocol 3.2: Authenticate
Security Parameters: k, n.
Usability Parameter: α
(User): Send username (u) and password (pw′) — pw′ may or may not be
correct.
(Server): Sends challenge cˆ to the user where cˆ is computed as follows:
Find t =
(
u, r′, s, hpw, ℓpi(1), . . . , ℓpi(k)
)
r′1 ← Extract (pw
′, r′)
〈I ′1, ..., I
′
k〉 ← GenerateInkblotImages (r
′
1, k)
cˆpi ←
(
〈I1, ..., Ik〉, 〈ℓpi(1), . . . , ℓpi(k)〉
)
(User): Solves cˆpi and sends the answer π
′ = H (cˆ, σt).
(Server):
for all π0 s.t dk (π0, π
′) ≤ α do
hpw,0 ← h (u, s, pw
′, π0(1), ..., π0(k))
if hpw,0 = hpw then
Authenticate
Deny
Our protocol could be updated to allow the user to reject challenges he
found confusing during account creation in protocol 3.1. In this case the server
would simply note that the first GOTCHA was confusing and generate a new
GOTCHA. Once our user has created an account he can login by following
protocol 3.2.
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Claim 1 says that a legitimate user can successfully authenticate if our
Inkblot construction satisfies the usability requirements of a GOTCHA. The
proof of claim 1 can be found in appendix A.
Claim 1 If (G1, G2) is a (α, β, ǫ, δ, µ)-GOTCHA then at least β-fraction of
humans can successfully authenticate using protocol 3.2 after creating an account
using protocol 3.1.
One way to improve usability of our authentication protocol is to increase the
neighborhood of acceptably close matchings by increasing α. The disadvantage
is that the running time for the server in protocol 3.2 increases with the size of
α. Claim 2 bounds the time needed to enumerate over all close permuations.
The proof of claim 2 can be found in appendix A.
Claim 2 For all permutations π : [k]→ [k] and α ≥ 0
|{π′ dk (π, π
′) ≤ α}| ≤ 1 +
α∑
i=2
(
k
i
)
i! .
For example, if the user matches k = 10 Inkblots and we want to accept
matchings that are off by at most α = 5 entries then the server would need
to enumerate over at most 36, 091 permutations8. Organizations are already
advised to use password hash functions like BCRYPT [35] which intentionally
designed to be slower than standard cryptographic hash functions — often by
a factor of millions. Instead of making the hash function a million times slower
to evaluate the server might instead make the hash function a thousand times
slower to evaluate and use these extra computation cycles to enumerate over
close permutations. The organization’s trade-off is between: security, usability
and the resources that it needs to invest during the authentication process.
We observe that an adversary mounting an online attack would be naturally
rate limited because he would need to solve a GOTCHA for each new guess.
Protocol 3.2 could also be supplemented with a k-strikes policy — in which a
user is locked out for several hours after k incorrect login attempts — if desired.
3.2 User Study
To test our candidate GOTCHA construction we conducted an online user
study9. We recruited participants through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to par-
ticipate in our study. The study was conducted in two phases. In phase 1 we
generated ten random Inkblot images for each participant, and asked each par-
ticipant to provide labels for their Inkblot images. Participants were advised
to use creative titles (e.g., evil clown, frog, lady with poofy dress) because they
would not need to remember the exact titles that they used. Participants were
paid $1 for completing this first phase. A total of 70 users completed phase 1.
8A more precise calculation reveals that there are exactly 13, 264 permutations s.t.
d10 (pi′, pi) ≤ 5 and a random permuation pi′ would only be accepted with probability
3.66× 10−3
9Our study protocol was approved for exemption by the Institutional Review Board (IRB)
at Carnegie Mellon University (IRB Protocol Number: HS13-219).
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Figure 2: Phase 1
After our participants completed the first phase we waited ten days before
asking our participants to return and complete phase 2. During phase 2 we
showed each participant the Inkblot images they saw in phase 1 (in a random
order) as well as the titles that they created during phase 1 (in alphabetical
order). Participants were asked to match the labels with the appropriate image.
The purpose of the longer waiting time was to make sure that participants
had time to forget their images and their labels. Participants were paid an
additional $1 for completing phase 2 of the user study. At the beginning of the
user study we let participants know that they would be paid during phase 2
even if their answers were not correct. We adopted this policy to discourage
cheating (e.g., using screen captures from phase 1 to match the images and the
labels) and avoid positively biasing our results.
We measured the time it took each participant to complete phase 1. Our
results are summarized in table 1. It is quite likely that some participants left
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Figure 3: Phase 2
Phase 1 Phase 2
Average 9.3 4.5
StdDev 9.6 3
Max 57.5 18.5
Min 1.4 1.6
Average ≤ 20 6.2 N/A
Table 1: Completion Times
their computer in the middle of the study and returned later to complete the
study (e.g., one user took 57.5 minutes to complete the study). While we could
not measure time away from the computer, we believe that it is likely that at
least 9 of our participants left the computer. Restricting our attention to the
other 61 participants who took at most 20 minutes we get an adjusted average
completion time of 6.2 minutes.
Fifty-eight of our participants returned to complete phase 2 by taking our
matching test. It took these participants 4.5 minutes on average to complete the
matching test. Seventeen of our participants correctly matched all ten of their
labels, and 69% of participants matched at least 5 out of ten labels correctly.
Our results are summarized in table 2.
Discussion Our user study provides evidence that our construction is at least
(0, 0.29)-usable or (5, 0.69)-usable. While this means that our Inkblot Matching
GOTCHA could be used by a significant fraction of the population to pro-
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α-accurate # partici-
pants
# participants
58
|{pi′ d10(pi,pi′)≤α}|
10!
α = 0 17 0.29 2.76× 10−7
α = 2 22 0.38 1.27× 10−5
α = 3 26 0.45 7.88× 10−5
α = 4 34 0.59 6.00× 10−4
α = 5 40 0.69 3.66× 10−3
Table 2: Usability Results: Fraction of Participants who would have authenti-
cated with accuracy parameter α
tect their passwords during authentication it also means that the use of our
GOTCHA would have to be voluntary so that users who have difficulty won’t
get locked out of their accounts. Another approach would be to construct dif-
ferent GOTCHAs and allow users to choose which GOTCHA to use during
authentication.
Study Incentives: There is evidence that the lack of monetary incentives
to perform well on our matching test may have negatively influenced the results
(e.g., some participants may have rushed through phase 1 of the study because
their payment in round 2 was independent of their ability to match their labels
correctly). For example, none of our 18 fastest participants during phase 1
matched all of their labels correctly, and — excluding participants we believe
left their computer during phase 1 (e.g., took longer than 20 minutes) — on
average participants who failed to match at least five labels correctly took 2
minutes less time to complete phase 1 than participants who did.
Time: We imagine that some web services may be reluctant to adopt
GOTCHAs out of fear driving away customers who don’t want to spend time
labeling Inkblot images [21]. However, we believe that for many high security
applications (e.g., online banking) the extra security benefits of GOTCHAs will
outweigh the costs — GOTCHAs might even help a bank keep its customers by
providing extra assurance that users’ passwords are secure. We are looking at
modifying our Inkblot generation algorithm to produce Inkblots which require
less “mental effort” to label. In particular could techniques like Perlin Noise
[34] be used to generate Inkblots that can be labeled more quickly and matched
more accurately?
Accuracy: We believe that the usability of our Inkblot Matching GOTCHA
construction can still be improved. One simple way to improve the usability
of our GOTCHA construction would be to allow the user to reject Inkblot
images that were confusing. We also believe that usability could be improved
by providing users with specific strategies for creating their labels (e.g., we
found that simple labels like “a voodoo mask” were often mismatched, while
more elaborate stories like “A happy guy on the ground, protecting himself
from ticklers” were rarely mismatched).
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3.3 An Open Challenge to the AI Community
We envision a rich interaction between the security community and the artifi-
cial intelligence community. To facilitate this interaction we present an open
challenge to break our GOTCHA scheme.
Challenge Setup We chose several random passwords
(pw1, ..., pw4)
$
← {0, 107} and pw5
$
← {0, 108}. We used a functionGenerateInkblots (pwi, 10)
to generate ten inkblots Ii1, ..., I
i
10 for each password, and we had a human label
each inkblot image 〈ℓi1, . . . , ℓ
i
10〉 ← H
(
〈Ii1, . . . , I
i
10〉, σ0
)
. We selected a random
permutation πi : [10]→ [10] for each account, and generated the tuple
Ti =
(
si, h (pwi, si, πi(1), ..., πi(10)) , ℓ
i
pii(1)
, ..., ℓipii(10)
)
,
where si is a randomly selected salt value and h is a cryptographic hash function.
We are releasing the source code that we used to generate the Inkblots and
evaluate the hash function h along with the tuples T1, ..., T5 — see
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~jblocki/GOTCHA-Challenge.html.
Challenge: Recover each password pwi.
Approaches One way to accomplish this goal would be to enumerate over ev-
ery possible password guess pw′i and evaluate h (pw
′
i, si, π(1), ..., π(10)) for every
possible permutation π : [10] → [10]. However, the goal of this challenge is to
see if AI techniques can be applied to attack our GOTCHA construction. We
intentionally selected our passwords from a smaller space to make the challenge
more tractable for AI based attacks, but to discourage participants from try-
ing to brute force over all password/permutation pairs we used BCRYPT (Level
15)10 — an expensive hash function — to encrypt the passwords. Our implemen-
tation allows the Inkblot images to be generated very quickly from a password
guess pw’ so an AI program that can use the labels in the password file to dis-
tinguish between the correct Inkblots returned by GenerateInkblots (pwi, 10)
and incorrect Inkblots returned by GenerateInkblots (pw′i, 10) would be able
to quickly dismiss incorrect guesses. Similarly, an AI program which generates a
small set of likely permutations for each password guess could allow an attacker
to quickly dismiss incorrect guesses.
4 Analysis: Cost of Offline Attacks
In this section we argue that our password scheme (protocols 3.2 and 3.1) sig-
nificantly mitigates the threat of offline attacks. An informal interpretation of
our main technical result — Theorem 1 — is that either (1) the adversary’s
10The level parameter specifies the computation complexity of hashing. The amount of
work necessary to evaluate the BCRYPT hash function increases exponentially with the level
so in our case the work increases by a factor of 215.
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offline attack is prohibitively expensive (2) there is a good chance that adver-
sary’s offline attack will fail, or (3) the underlying GOTCHA construction can
be broken. Observe that the security guarantees are still meaningful even if the
security parameters ǫ and δ are not negligably small.
Theorem 1 Suppose that our user selects his password uniformly at random
from a set D (e.g., pw
$
← D) and creates his account using protocol 3.1. If algo-
rithms 2 and 3 are an (ǫ, δ, µ)-GOTCHA then no conservative offline adversary
is
(
C, γ + ǫ+ δ + nH|D| , D
)
-successful for C < γ|D|2µ(k)ch + nHcH
Proof of Theorem 1. (Sketch) We use a hybrid argument. An adversary who
breaches the server is able to recover the tuple t =
(
u, r′, s, h (u, s, pw, π(1), . . . , π(k)) , ℓpi(1), . . . , ℓpi(k)
)
as well as the code for the cryptographic hash function h and the code for our
GOTCHA — (G1, G2).
1. World 0: W0 denotes the real world in which the adversary has recovered
the tuple
t0 =
(
u, r′, s, h (u, s, pw, π(1), . . . , π(k)) , ℓpi(1), . . . , ℓpi(k)
)
as well as the code for the cryptographic hash function h and the code for
our GOTCHA — (G1, G2). Because the adversary Adv is conservative it
constructs the function
VerifyHash (pw′, π′) =
{
1 if pw′ = pw and π′ = π
0 otherwise.
,
and usesVerifyHash as a blackbox. We say thatAdv queries a humanH
about password pw′ if it queriesH forH
(
GenerateInkblotImages
(
1k,Extract (pw′, r′)
))
,
and we let D′ ⊆ D denote the set of passwords for which the adversary
queries a human.
2. World 1: W1 denotes a hypothetical world that is similar to W0 except
that VerifyHash function the adversary uses as a blackbox is replaced
with the following incorrect version
VerifyHash1 (pw′, π′) = {
1 if pw′ /∈ D′, pw′ = pw and π′ = π
0 otherwise.
,
where D′ ⊆ D is a subset of passwords which denotes the set of passwords
for which the adversary makes queries to a human in the real world.
3. World 2: W2 denotes a hypothetical world that is similar to W1 except
that VerifyHash1 function the adversary uses as a blackbox is replaced
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with the following incorrect version
VerifyHash2 (pw′, π′) =

1 if π′ = R
(
G2
(
1k,Extract (pw′, r′) , ℓ1, . . . , ℓk
))
and pw′ /∈ D′, pw′ = pw
0 otherwise.
,
where R is a distribution with minimum entropy µ(k) as in definition 4.
4. World 3: W3 denotes a hypothetical real world which is similar to world 2,
except that the labels ℓpi(1), . . . , ℓpi(k) are replaced with the labels ℓ
′
pi′(1), . . . , ℓ
′
pi′(k),
where π′ : [k] → [k] is a new random permutation, and the labels ℓ′i are
for a completely unrelated set of Inkblot challenges
ℓ′1, . . . , ℓk ← H
(
G1
(
1k, x1, x2
))
,
where x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}
n are freshly chosen random value.
In world 3 it is easy to bound the adversary’s probability of success. No ad-
versary is (C, γ,D)-successful for C < γ|D|2µ(k)ch, because the fake Inkblot
labels are not correlated with the actual Inblots that were generated with
the real password. Our particular advesary cannot be (C, γ,D)-successful for
C < γ|D|2µ(k)ch + |D
′|cH . In world 2 the adversary might improve his chances
of success by looking at the Inblot labels, but by definition of (α, β, ǫ, δ, µ)-
GOTCHA his chances change by at most δ. In world 1 the adversary might fur-
ther improve his chances of success, but by definition of (α, β, ǫ, δ, µ)-GOTCHA
his chances improve by at most ǫ. Finally, in world 0 the adversary improves
his chances by at most |D′|/|D| by querying the human about passwords in D′.

5 Discussion
We conclude by discussing some key directions for future work.
Other GOTCHAConstructions Because GOTCHAs allow for human feed-
back during puzzle generation — unlike HOSPs [14] — our definition potentially
opens up a much wider space of potential GOTCHA constructions. One idea
might be to have a user rate/rank random items (e.g., movies, activities, foods).
By allowing human feedback we could allow the user to dismiss potentially con-
fusing items (e.g., movies he hasn’t seen, foods about which he has no strong
opinion). There is some evidence that this approach could provide security (e.g.,
Narayanan and Shmatikov showed that a Netflix user can often be uniquely
identified from a few movie ratings [32].).
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Obfuscating CAPTCHAs If it were possible to efficiently obfuscate pro-
grams then it would be easy to construct GOTCHAs from CAPTCHAs (e.g.,
just obfuscate a program that returns the CAPTCHA without the answer).
Unfortunately, there is no general program obsfuscator [8]. However, the ap-
proach may not be entirely hopeless. Point functions [46] can be obfuscated,
and our application is similar to a point function — the puzzle generator G2
in an GOTCHA only needs to generate a human solvable puzzle for one input.
Recently, multilinear maps have been used to obfuscate conjunctions [13] and
to obfuscate NC1 circuits [23] 11. Could similar techniques be used obfuscate
CAPTCHAs?
Exploiting The Power of Interaction Can interaction be exploited and
used to improve security or usability in human-authentication? While inter-
action is an incredibly powerful tool in computer security (e.g., nonces [36],
zero-knowledge proofs [24], secure multiparty computation [48]) and in complex-
ity theory12, human authentication typically does not exploit interaction with
the human (e.g., the user simply enters his password). We view the idea behind
HOSPs and GOTCHAs — exploiting interaction to mitigate the threat of offline
attacks — as a positive step in this direction. Could interaction be exploited to
reduce memory burden on the user by allowing a user to reuse the same secret to
authenticate to multiple different servers? The human-authentication protocol
of Hopper, et al. [26] — based on the noisy parity problem — could be used by
a human to repeatedly authenticate over an insecure channel. Unfortunately,
the protocol is slow and tedious for a human to execute, and it can be broken
if the adversary is able to ask adaptive parity queries [30].
References
[1] Rockyou hack: From bad to worse.
http://techcrunch.com/2009/12/14/rockyou-hack-security-myspace-
facebook-passwords/, December 2009. Retrieved 9/27/2012.
[2] Update on playstation network/qriocity services.
http://blog.us.playstation.com/2011/04/22/update-on-playstation-
network-qriocity-services/, April 2011. Retrieved 5/22/2012.
[3] Data breach at ieee.org: 100k plaintext passwords. http://ieeelog.com/,
September 2012. Retrieved 9/27/2012.
11The later result used a weaker notion of obfuscation known as “indistinguishability obfus-
cation,” which (loosely) only guarantees that the adversary cannot distinguish between the
obfuscations of two circuits which compute the same function.
12A polynomial time verifier can verify PSPACE-complete languages by interacting with
a powerful prover [40], by contrast the same verifier can only check proofs of NP-Complete
languages without interaction.
21
[4] An update on linkedin member passwords compromised.
http://blog.linkedin.com/2012/06/06/linkedin-member-passwords-
compromised/, June 2012. Retrieved 9/27/2012.
[5] Zappos customer accounts breached. http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-
01-16/mark-smith-zappos-breach-tips/52593484/1, January 2012. Re-
trieved 5/22/2012.
[6] S. Alexander. Password protection for modern operating systems. ;login,
June 2004.
[7] A. Baddeley. Human memory: Theory and practice. Psychology Pr, 1997.
[8] B. Barak, O. Goldreich, R. Impagliazzo, S. Rudich, A. Sahai, S. Vadhan,
and K. Yang. On the (im) possibility of obfuscating programs. In Advances
in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2001, pages 1–18. Springer, 2001.
[9] S. Biddle. Anonymous leaks 90,000 military email accounts in lat-
est antisec attack. http://gizmodo.com/5820049/anonymous-leaks-90000-
military-email-accounts-in-latest-antisec-attack, July 2011. Retrieved
8/16/2011.
[10] J. Blocki, M. Blum, and A. Datta. Naturally rehearsing passwords. In
Advances in Cryptology-ASIACRYPT 2013 (to appear).
[11] J. Bonneau. The science of guessing: analyzing an anonymized corpus of
70 million passwords. In Proc. of Oakland, pages 538–552, 2012.
[12] J. Bonneau and S. Preibusch. The password thicket: technical and market
failures in human authentication on the web. In Proc. of WEIS, volume
2010, 2010.
[13] Z. Brakerski and G. N. Rothblum. Obfuscating conjunctions. In Advances
in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2013, pages 416–434. Springer, 2013.
[14] R. Canetti, S. Halevi, and M. Steiner. Mitigating dictionary attacks on
password-protected local storage. In Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO
2006, pages 160–179. Springer, 2006.
[15] W. Daher and R. Canetti. Posh: A generalized captcha with security
applications. In Proceedings of the 1st ACM workshop on Workshop on
AISec, pages 1–10. ACM, 2008.
[16] M. Dailey and C. Namprempre. A text graphics character captcha for pass-
word authentication. In TENCON 2004. 2004 IEEE Region 10 Conference,
pages 45–48. IEEE, 2004.
[17] S. Designer. John the Ripper. http://www.openwall.com/john/, 1996-2010.
22
[18] K. Doel. Scary logins: Worst passwords of 2012 and how to fix them.
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2012/10/prweb10046001.htm, 2012. Re-
trieved 1/21/2013.
[19] J. Elson, J. R. Douceur, J. Howell, and J. Saul. Asirra: a captcha that
exploits interest-aligned manual image categorization. In Proc. of CCS.
[20] D. Florencio and C. Herley. A large-scale study of web password habits.
In Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web,
pages 657–666. ACM, 2007.
[21] D. Floreˆncio and C. Herley. Where do security policies come from? In
Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security, pages
1–14. ACM, 2010.
[22] M. Fossi, E. Johnson, D. Turner, T. Mack, J. Blackbird, D. McKinney,
M. K. Low, T. Adams, M. P. Laucht, and J. Gough. Symantec report on
the undergorund economy, November 2008. Retrieved 1/8/2013.
[23] S. Garg, C. Gentry, S. Halevi, M. Raykova, A. Sahai, and B. Waters. Can-
didate indistinguishability obfuscation and functional encryption for all cir-
cuits. In Proc. of FOCS (to appear), 2013.
[24] O. Goldreich, A. Sahai, and S. Vadhan. Can statistical zero knowledge
be made non-interactive? or on the relationship of SZK and NISZK. In
Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 1999, pages 467–484, 1999.
[25] D. Goodin. Why passwords have never been weaker and crackers have
never been stronger. http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/08/passwords-
under-assault/, 2012.
[26] N. J. Hopper and M. Blum. Secure human identification protocols. In
Advances in Cryptology-ASIACRYPT 2001, pages 52–66. Springer, 2001.
[27] Imperva. Consumer password worst practices. 2010. Retrived 1/22/2013.
[28] S. Komanduri, R. Shay, P. Kelley, M. Mazurek, L. Bauer, N. Christin,
L. Cranor, and S. Egelman. Of passwords and people: measuring the effect
of password-composition policies. In Proc. of CHI, pages 2595–2604, 2011.
[29] H. Kruger, T. Steyn, B. Medlin, and L. Drevin. An empirical assessment of
factors impeding effective password management. Journal of Information
Privacy and Security, 4(4):45–59, 2008.
[30] E. Kushilevitz and Y. Mansour. Learning decision trees using the Fourier
spectrum. SIAM J. Comput., 22(6):1331–1348, 1993.
[31] M. Motoyama, K. Levchenko, C. Kanich, D. McCoy, G. M. Voelker, and
S. Savage. Re: Captchas–understanding captcha-solving services in an eco-
nomic context. In USENIX Security Symposium, volume 10, 2010.
23
[32] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov. Robust de-anonymization of large sparse
datasets. In Proc. of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
pages 111–125. IEEE, 2008.
[33] P. Oechslin. Making a faster cryptanalytic time-memory trade-off. Ad-
vances in Cryptology-CRYPTO 2003, pages 617–630, 2003.
[34] K. Perlin. Implementing improved perlin noise. GPU Gems, pages 73–85,
2004.
[35] N. Provos and D. Mazieres. Bcrypt algorithm.
[36] P. Rogaway. Nonce-based symmetric encryption. In Fast Software Encryp-
tion, pages 348–358. Springer, 2004.
[37] G. Sauer, H. Hochheiser, J. Feng, and J. Lazar. Towards a universally
usable captcha. In Proceedings of the 4th Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security, 2008.
[38] K. Scarfone and M. Souppaya. NIST special publication 800-118: Guide
to enterprise password management (draft), 2009.
[39] D. Seeley. Password cracking: A game of wits. Communications of the
ACM, 32(6):700–703, 1989.
[40] A. Shamir. Ip= pspace. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 39(4):869–877, 1992.
[41] A. Singer. No plaintext passwords. ;login: THE MAGAZINE OF USENIX
& SAGE, 26(7), November 2001. Retrieved 8/16/2011.
[42] A. Stubblefield and D. Simon. Inkblot authentication. Technical report,
2004.
[43] L. Von Ahn, M. Blum, N. Hopper, and J. Langford. Captcha: Using hard ai
problems for security. Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2003, pages
646–646, 2003.
[44] L. Von Ahn, B. Maurer, C. McMillen, D. Abraham, and M. Blum. re-
captcha: Human-based character recognition via web security measures.
Science, 321(5895):1465–1468, 2008.
[45] M. J. Watkins and J. M. Gardiner. An appreciation of generate-recognize
theory of recall. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18(6):687–
704, 1979.
[46] H. Wee. On obfuscating point functions. In Proc. of STOC, pages 523–532.
ACM, 2005.
[47] R. Witty, K. Brittain, and A. Allen. Justify identity management invest-
ment with metrics. Gartner Group report, 2004.
24
[48] A. C. Yao. Protocols for secure computations. In Proc. of FOCS, pages
160–164, 1982.
[49] A. Zonenberg. Distributed hash cracker: A cross-platform gpu-accelerated
password recovery system. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, page 27, 2009.
25
A Missing Proofs
Reminder of Claim 1. If (G1, G2) is a (α, β, ǫ, δ, µ)-GOTCHA then at
least β-fraction of humans can sucessfully authenticate using protocol 3.2 after
creating an account using protocol 3.1.
Proof of Claim 1. A legitimate user H ∈ H will use the same passwords in
protocols 3.1 and 3.2. Hence,
r′1 = Extract (pw
′, r′) = Extract (pw, r′) = r1 ,
and the final matching challenge cˆpi is the same one that would be generated by
G2
(
1k, r1, H
(
G1
(
1k, r1, r2
)
, σ0
))
. If cˆpi is consistently solvable with accuracy
α by H — by definition 4 this is the case for at least β-fraction of users — then
it follows that
dk (π, π
′, σt) ≤ α ,
where H
(
G1
(
1k, r1, r2
))
. For some π0 (namely π0 = π) s.t. dk (π0, π
′) ≤ α it
must be the case that
hpw,0 = h (u, s, pw
′, π0(1), ..., π0(k))
= h (u, s, pw, π(1), ..., π(k))
= hpw ,
and protocol 3.2 accepts. 
Reminder of Claim Claim 2. For all permutations π : [k]→ [k] and α ≥ 0
|{π′ dk (π, π
′) ≤ α}| ≤ 1 +
α∑
i=2
(
k
i
)
i! .
Proof of 2. It suffices to show that
(
k
j
)
j! ≥ |{π′ dk (π, π
′) = j}|. We first
choose the j unique indices i1, . . . , ij on which π and π
′ differ — there are
(
k
j
)
ways to do this. Once we have fixed our indices i1, . . . , ij we define π
′ (k) = π (k)
for each k /∈ {i1, . . . , ij}. Now j! upperbounds the number of ways of selecting
the remaining values π′ (ik) s.t. π (ik) 6= π
′ (ik) for all k ≤ j. 
B HOSP: Pre-Generated CAPTCHAs
The HOSP construction proposed by [14] was to simply fill several high capacity
hard drives with randomly generated CAPTCHAs — discarding the solutions.
Once we have compiled a database large D of CAPTCHAs we can use algo-
rithm 4 as our challenge generator — simply return a random CAPTCHA from
D. The advantage of this approach is that we can make use of already tested
CAPTCHA solutions so there is no need to make hardness assumptions about
new AI problems. The primary disadvantage of this approach is that the size
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of the database D will be limited by economic considerations — storage isn’t
free. While |D| the number of CAPTCHAs that could be stored on a hard drive
may be large, it is not exponentially large. An adversary could theoretically
pay humans to solve every puzzle in D at which point the scheme would be
completely broken.
Algorithm 4 GenerateChallenge
Input: Random bits r ∈ {0, 1}n, Database D = {P1, ..., P2n} of CAPTCHAs
return Pr
Economic Cost Suppose that two 4 TB hard drives are filled will text CAPTCHAS
13. Let S be the space required to store one CAPTCHA, and let CH denote the
cost of paying a human to solve a CAPTCHA. We use the values S = 8 KB
14 and CH = $0.001
15. In this case |D| = 4 TB8KB ≈ 10
9 so we can store a
billion unsolved CAPTCHAs on the hard drives. It would cost the adversary
|D|CH = $1, 000, 000 to solve all of the CAPTCHAs — or $500, 000 to solve half
of them. The up front cost of this attack may be large, but once the adversary
has solved the CAPTCHAs he can execute offline dictionary attacks against ev-
ery user who had an account on the server. Many server breaches have resulted
in the release of password records for millions of accounts [5, 4, 2, 1]. If each
cracked password is worth between $4 and $30 [22] then it may be easily worth
the cost to pay humans to solve every CAPTCHA in D.
13At the time of submission a 4 TB hard drive can be purchased on Amazon for less than
$162.
14The exact value of S may vary slightly depending on the particular method used to
generate the CAPTCHA. When we compressed a text CAPTCHA using popular GIF format
the resulting files were consistently 8 KB.
15Motoyama, et al. estimated that spammers paid humans $1 to solve a thousand
CAPTCHAs [31]
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